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RESOURCE MOBILIZATION AND THE

"No"

IN PINOCHET'S CHILE

CORREY DIVINEY

In 1988, General Pinochet, nearing the end ofhis eight-year presidential tenn, organized a new presidential election as a simple yes or no plebiscite. The surprising success of the ''No'' campaign in deposing General Pinochet
has been explained mostly through traditional social movement theory, focusing on grievances and deprivation of
the social movement participants. This study, hOUJez,er, will show that the success ofthe ''No'' campaign is instead
best explained by the application of resource mobiliz.ation theory.

The surprising success of the "No" campaign in effectively deposing General Pinochet
in the 1988 Chilean plebiscite presents an interesting anomaly for social movement scholars.
The question of how an opposition movement
that was absolutely unsuccessful in its efforts
over an almost fifteen year period was finally
able to end military rule seems at first very
puzzling. Many researchers have attempted to
explain the movement through the lens of traditional social movement theory. Such research
has focused on grievances of the politically disenfranchised Left and Center and has identified
those grievances as the underlying impetus for
the success of the campaign. While it is clear
that grievances and the deprivation of the social
movement participants played some role in the
"No" campaign, left by themselves these factors
do not adequately explain why the Chilean public was able to oust General Pinochet from office
after fifteen years of authoritarian rule. For, if

grievances and relative deprivation alone were
the dominant factors, why hadn't there been a
decisive campaign prior to 1988? More to the
point, why had prior social movements, especially those held during periods of economic crisis, failed to overturn the military regime? This
article will argue that grievances and deprivation
were not the most important factors in Chile's
return to democracy. Instead, it will be argued
that the success of the "No" campaign is best
explained by the application of resource mobilization theory. Indeed, the savvy leadership
provided by a sophisticated elite, in the form of
valuable research conducted and analyzed and
intensive campaigning based on that research,
was the most important factor in explaining the
success of the Chilean opposition in their efforts
to end military rule. In order to better understand how the social movement elite determined
the outcome of the campaign, it is important to
first understand the intricacies of the resource
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mobilization approach to social movement
theory.l
RESOURCE MOBILIZATION THEORY

When the resource mobilization approach
was introduced to the scholarly dialogue on
social movement theories in the early 1970s, it
represented a radical departure from the
accepted thinking of the day. While the relative
deprivation theory, as developed and defended
by such respected social scientists as Ted Robert
Gurr, focuses heavily on the psychology of social
movement participants, resource mobilization
focuses on the resources available to a social
movement and the management of such
resources by an elite sector. The resource mobilization approach recognizes the importance of
deprivation and grievances in mobilizing a collectivity to protest. However, it suggests that
there are more important factors at play than
simply the degree of frustration of a population.
In fact, it goes so far as to suggest that there
is always enough deprivation/frustration within
a society to generate a social movement. Indeed,
resource mobilization theorists assert that even if
there is not a great degree of antipathy towards a
potential object of protest, it can be generated by
a sophisticated elite group.
In rejecting the traditional social movement explanations, resource mobilization theorists point to other factors in their attempts to
identity the most significant elements of a successful social movement. This new approach recognizes that successful social movements require
the consistent supply of resources. Time and
financial support typically constitute the bulk of
such resources. The organization and strategic
efforts essential to a successful social movement
demand the time and energy of a movement's
most politically sophisticated participants. Not
only does the leadership of a movement typically
require some type of financial support simply to
provide for its physical sustenance, but the activities of the leadership also require some degree of
financial expense. In other words, not only do
the "employees" of a social movement need a
salary to live on so that they can continue their
efforts, but they also need money to purchase
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the paper their work is printed on, they need the
technology to perform statistical analysis, they
need money to pay their phone bill, etc.
Consequently, resource mobilization
focuses heavily on the flow of resources to the
elite of a social movement. This approach seeks
to identity the external sources of support and
weighs their importance according to their donations. In order to better understand some of the
fundamental contributions of resource mobilization theory, it is useful to use a familiar example
from recent American history. In attempting an
explanation of the success of the American civil
rights movement of the 1960s, proponents of
traditional social movement theories would
point to the degree of oppression suffered by
American blacks of that period. The deprivation
of that collectivity, relative to its white counterpart, would be used to explain the widespread
protests that typified the political climate of the
American South of that time. Other theorists
would perhaps seek to explain the rise in participation in the social movement as the result of
cost/benefit analysis performed by the participants. These researchers would assert that the
decade of the 1960s was the first time in American history when protest against the white establishment would actually have been a rational act,
given the estimated costs and benefits of such
behavior. Resource mobilization theory, on the
other hand, explains the success of the Civil
Rights Movement as the result of the highly
organized and well-funded efforts of an elite few
that led activist organizations such as the SNCC,
the NAACP, CORE, and the SCLC. Instead of
focusing on the frustrated masses, resource
mobilization theorists investigate the influence
of conscience constituents. In the case of the
Civil Rights Movement, the relatively few
Northern white liberals who provided hefty
financial support for the protests are seen as
more necessary to the success of the movement
than are the tens of thousands of disenfranchised, poor Southern blacks who participated in
the marches and sit-ins. The rationale for such a
bold assertion is the belief that there had always
been a great deal of discontent within Southern
black society, but it was not until there emerged
a highly professionalized, educated, and securely
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funded social movement sector that this society
most influential in the success of the "No"
was mobilized to consistent and effective protests.
campaign, and those that this paper will focus
upon, were the social science research centers. A
A thorough discussion of the Chilean protest
few of the most influential of the Chilean
movement that culminated in the "No" would
necessarily include an in-depth treatment of
research institutes were the Center for the Study
the role of foreign donations in supporting the
of Chilean Reality (CERC), the Center for Social
movement. Given the limited scope of this artiStudies and Education (SUR), the Latin Americle, this important factor will have to be omitted.
can Faculty of the Social Sciences (FLASCO), the
Latin American Institute of Transnational Studies
Instead, this work will focus on the sophisticated
leadership of the movement and the resources,
(I LET) , the Center for Political Studies (CEP) ,
other than financial, drawn upon.
and the Center for Development Studies (CED)
As with any social science theory, the
(Puryear 1994, 131-41).
resource mobilization approach utilizes a someA social movement organization is made up
what specialized vocabulary. A thorough underof a variety of different actors, who can be classified into a few main types. An adherent is an
standing of this theory and its application to
the "No" campaign in Chile
individual or organization
requires a review of the essenIt was not until there emthat philosophically supports
tial terms of resource mobithe goals of a social moveerged a highly professionallization theory and the
ment organization. A conand
securely
ized,
educated,
unique meanings these terms
stituent is an individual or
funded social movement
have within this research parorganization who provides
adigm. To begin with, a
resources to a social movesector that society was
social movement is loosely
ment organization and can
mobilized to consistent and
defined as a collectivity uniexpect to benefit if a social
effective protests.
fied by a common preference
movement
organization
for some type of change
achieves its purposes. A
within its society. For our purposes in discussing
potential beneficiary is any individual or organithe "No" campaign we will define this movement
zation that stands to benefit if a social movement
as the shared preference to terminate the Pinochet
organization accomplishes its designs. A conpresidency. Of course, the Chilean protest movescience adherent is an individual or organization
ment also encompassed many more preferences;
that philosophically supports a social movement
some groups were pushing for a return to Socialbut stands to gain nothing (other than perhaps a
ist government, some groups were fighting for full
sense of satisfaction) from the attainment of a
accountability for human rights offenses, still
social movement organization's goals. A conother groups were fighting for democratization.
science constituent is an individual or group
thatcontributes resources to a social movement
But the only preference shared by all participants
was that Pinochet should not continue to govern
organization but stands to gain nothing if the
Chile.
social movement organization is in fact successA countermovement is a collectivity within
ful. Among the most significant conscience conthe same society unified by a common opposistituents with respect to the "No" campaign were
tion to the preferences of the social movement.
North American donor organizations. Some of
In the case we are discussing, the countermovethese organizations, such as the National
ment would be the preference shared by all those
Endowment for Democracy, actually channeled
public funds towards democratic reform in Chile
who supported Pinochet's government.
(Muravchik 1991, 209-10). Others, such as the
A social movement organization is a formal
Ford Foundation, drew upon their own resources
organization that identifies its preferences with
those of a given social movement and whose
to support the "No" (Sigmund 1993, 167). The
role of conscience constituents, such as the aforeobjective it is to achieve the goals of that social
movement. The social movement organizations
mentioned donor organizations, cannot be

SIG!v1A •

51

RESOURCE MOBILIZATION

underestimated in explaining the success of the
Chilean plebiscite campaign. Again, although
these conscience constituents were an invaluable
asset to the social movement organizations that
led the plebiscite campaign, the details of their
involvement are beyond the scope of this article.
Each of these groups-the adherents, the
conscience constituents, the social movements
organizations, and so forth-played an important
role in the Chilean plebiscite. The social movement, as represented by numerous social organizations, relied upon adherents, constituents,
conscience adherents and constituents, and
potential beneficiaries in its efforts to garner
sufficient votes to force Pinochet from office.
The existence of sophisticated social movement
organizations, unified under a common purpose,
and supported by adherents and constituents, is
what distinguishes the "No" campaign from
earlier unsuccessful opposition movements in
Chile. The prominent role played by the aforementioned actors justifies the conclusion that
the resource mobilization approach is the most
effective framework in which to study the
unprecedented success of the demand for
the "No."
HISTORICAL BACKDROP

From the early 1930s until Pinochet's military coup in 1973, Chile's democratic tradition
was among the strongest in all of Latin America.
It was notable for its durability even amidst
political and economic turmoil and for its implementation of an effective and truly representative
multi-party system. The Left, Center, and Right
were all given voice in a form similar to that of
many European countries.
In 1970, Salvador Allende, the presidential
candidate for the Popular Unity (the coalition
then representing the Left), won the presidential
election with only 36% of the vote (Drake 1991,
3). The multi-party, winner-take-all electoral rules
enabled Allende to take office with a minuscule
margin of victory and a support base representing
barely more than a third of the population.
Allende's Leftist ideology, combined with his relatively small base and far-reaching agenda for social
reform, created a recipe for turmoil.
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In the midterm congressional elections of
March 1973, an alliance of the Center and Right
parties received 54% of the vote to the Popular
Unity's (UP) 44% (Roberts 1998, 88). This led
to a standoff between the executive branch and
the legislative branch. The opponents of the Up,
aided by an economy buckling under the inflation brought on by the redistributive policies of
Allende's socialist experiment, plotted a military
overthrow. On September 11, 1973, this opposition, led by General Augusto Pinochet, overthrew the Allende regime. Allende refused offers
to be flown into exile and killed himself upon
the invasion of the military into the presidential
palace (Roberts 1998,91-4).
The Pinochet regime-made up of a coalition of technocrats, business elites, and most
importantly, military leadership-began an
unprecedented violation of constitutional law
and human rights in Chile. Soon after Pinochet
gained power, Congress was shut down and the
constitution abrogated (Sigmund 1993, 85, 93).
In order for the regime to survive, all outspoken
supporters of democracy had to be silenced.
Pinochet undertook this task ruthlessly and
relentlessly. Social organizations, long the bastions of democracy, were suppressed and disassembled. Those with ties to organized labor
were entirely eliminated. The armed forces tortured, killed, and exiled thousands of Chileans.
Even those, such as students and university
professors, who were traditionally protected by
cultural norms, were subject to the brutality of
this purging. Roberts documents how within six
months the military had arrested an estimated
80,000 persons, 160,000 had "suffered politically motivated job dismissals," and another estimated 200,000 people went into exile (94).
After the popular sector had been effectively
crippled, the regime turned its attentions towards
implementing neo-liberal economic reforms. Just
as the politics of Chile had undergone a transformation from democracy to authoritarianism, the
economy went from state-oriented to market
driven. Under the direction of a group of young,
American-educated technocrats known as the
"Chicago Boys," the economy experienced dramatic growth (Drake 1991, 55). The period from
1977 to 1981 became known as the "Chilean
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miracle" (Drake 1991, 253-4). However, the
miracle was not wrought without severe social
costs. Unemployment rates soared and the distribution of wealth became more disparate than
ever. This created growing resentment among
those left out of the successes of the regime, especially the already disgruntled urban working
class. The use of brutality to quell the occasional
protest continued to be a common practice
throughout this period. The Latin American debt
crisis of 1982 altered Pinochet's course drastically.
After riding on the success of the economic
reforms, the regime was severely damaged by the
recession; the GNP decreased by over 14% in
1982 alone (Sigmund 1993, 139). Pinochet's
policies of economic openness further increased
the vulnerability of the domestic economy and
intensified the effects of the recession. Thus,
ironically, the economic globalization embraced
by the regime created its first political crisis. The
widespread effects on all classes within Chilean
society created deepened disenchantment with
the Pinochet regime, even among those who had
previously supported it.
The period of 1983-86 was marked
by the nationwide protest movement that
attacked the regime's human rights violations, its
economic policies, and the legitimacy of the
regime itself. Led mostly by former labor unionists and students, the movement's most effective
form of collective action were the national days
of protest that mobilized tens of thousands,
sometimes even hundreds of thousands, of
Chileans into the public squares to defy the military regime. Other groups, such as the FPMR,
were more given to direct, violent attacks on predesignated targets. These leftist groups were also
responsible for the kidnappings and murders of
government officials and police officers.
Despite the relatively high-level of participation, this protest movement failed to
achieve its ultimate objective-the forced exit
of Pinochet from control of the Chilean government. The failure of these groups to achieve their
desired ends is fairly easy to explain. The leadership of the movement was largely made up of
uneducated workers, inexperienced students,
and illogical radicals. The dramatically different
political ideologies held by these participants and

their failure to come together to form a cohesive
force was the biggest factor in the movement's
failure. The strategies devised by groups to the
Center were far too moderate and pacifist for
those on the Left. And the terrorist actions
of those on the Left frightened many moderates
away from any form of protest whatsoever. The
Leftist violence also undermined the moderate
efforts of Centrists and gave the military regime
the justification it needed to squash the movement as a whole. Both of these groups, due to
their lack of social prestige and visibility, were
easily oppressed and even eliminated when the
regime deemed such action necessary. Their
leadership, never a bastion of efficiency, was easily rendered useless by the tactics of the military
government. Lack of organization, lack of access
to resources, and lack of sophisticated strategy
led to the eventual failure of the movement to
accomplish its ultimate goal of removing
Pinochet from office.
Ironically, however, despite the regime's
effectiveness in eventually quieting the protest
movement, the movement's exposure of the
weaknesses of the government's economic policies
did lead to a period of liberalization. Consequently, the press was allowed more openness,
and, in 1987, a law was passed allowing the reintroduction of political parties onto the national
stage (Puryear 1994, 127-8). This contradictory
environment of repression and concessions set
the stage for the "No" campaign.
THE

"No"

As part of the earlier passage of the revised
constitution put forth by the military government, the presidential term had been extended
to eight years, with no laws limiting the number
of terms (Drake 1991, 52). The President
(Pinochet) had been given the right to deem the
election a simple yes or no plebiscite and was not
expected to give more than two months notice
regarding the specific date on which the
plebiscite would occur, but one would have to
take place in 1988, that being the end of an
eight-year term. Those opposed to the Pinochet
government faced significant obstacles in
attempting to achieve a "no" vote. First of all, the
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lack of options set forth by the regime presented
nities provided by the research centers.
the opposition with no opportunity to set forth
Another function the research centers protheir own candidates. Additionally, in a country
vided was that their work contributed, through
with so many political parties and of such diverse
innovative polling techniques, a fairly accurate
political ideologies, the method of unseating
assessment of the political life of the opposition
Pinochet and the choice of a new leader could
in Chile. In the terminology of resource mobiabsolutely not be agreed upon. Unity among the
lization theory, the centers were able to deduce
opposition seemed an almost insurmountable
accurate estimates of the numbers of adherents,
task. A second obstacle was the unknown date of
constituents, and potential beneficiaries there
the plebiscite. Not being able to put a time frame
were within Chilean society. This was an invaluon their planning made effective strategizing
able tool in setting the groundwork for the
difficult. Another significant impediment to the
plebiscite. Up until this time, the only real pubopposition was the culture of fear created by
lic opinion polls based on political sentiment
fifteen years of oppressive military rule. Many
were those carried out by the military governpotential beneficiaries were hesitant to become
ment. The results of these were rarely made availpolitically active for fear of
able to the public and were
punishment by an intolerant
The conclusion drawn porof questionable accuracy.
regime if the campaign were
With
the governmental libtrayed a Chilean public that
unsuccessful. These are but a
eralization that followed the
opposed political violence,
few of the difficult problem;
economic crisis of the early
was
not
entirely
commited
the opposition faced in their
1980s, private research centers were allowed more leeefforts to unseat Pinochet.
to any single political stance
However, social movement
way in their efforts to gage
or to the exit of General
organizations, in accordance
public opinion.
Pinochet,
but
that
was
The Center for the
with resource mobilization
Study of Contemporary
theory, were able to overalmost uniformly supportive
Reality (CERC), a Santiago
come these obstacles.
of democratic principles.
based research facility, was
Political parties were
among the first and most
banned under Pinochet until
important of the many centers that effectively
1987. The many social science research centers
became social movement organizations working
in Chile took the place of the parties as the centowards democratic change in Chile. CERC
ters of political thought and activity in the years
researchers began holding workshops to discuss
prior to the plebiscite. As the centers were prithe prospects for carrying out public opinion
vately funded, somewhat less conspicuous than
studies in Chile in the mid-1980s. These workthe universities, and without the overtly political
shops came to include international public opinintentions held by the parties, the research cenion experts who had conducted influential survey
ters never became the target of government cenresearch during democratic transitions of other
sorship. These centers were essential to the
nations, such as that of Spain in 1975. Following
survival of the opposition in that they simply
the lead of social research organization Diagnos,
provided employment for the many politically
whose general, nonpolitical survey work had
minded intellectuals who would usher in the
showed the public as responsive to polls of this
democratic transition. The suffering economy
nature, CERC began to conduct surveys. Unlike
and the censorship of university life would surely
Diagnos, however, the purely academically motihave encouraged these elites to seek employment
vated surveys were politically slanted. As the
in American or European universities. As many
results increasingly suggested that Chileans
of these academicians had already received docwould indeed respond to political surveys, the
torate degrees from prestigious foreign universiresearchers became bolder in their efforts to
ties, life as expatriates would have been the most
understand the political climate of Chile under
sensible option, had it not been for the opportu-
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Pinochet. In 1987, the CERC researchers conducted the first nationwide survey of political
attitudes since the coup (Puryear 1994, 134-8).
Another research center whose work had
invaluable implications to the opposition movement was the Latin American Faculty of the
Social Sciences (FLACSO). Like CERC,
FLACSO's early surveys began as contract work
for private entities. In one of these early surveys,
prepared in Spain for the Spanish government in
order to determine Chilean public opinion concerning that country, FLACSO researchers,
apparently more out of curiosity than any real
political designs, decided to throw in a few politically slanted questions. The test was to determine whether the Chilean public would respond
to inquiries as to their political leanings. The
regime had been so intolerant of political expression that many researchers operated under the
assumption that Chileans would be reluctant to
commit their positions to paper. When this
proved not to be the case, FLACSO researchers,
again out of academic interest, began to develop
more direct surveys. In the years leading up to
the 1988 plebiscite, FLACSO's surveys helped
to dispel many of the false notions previously
held by the opposition elite, and the center
emerged as one of the opposition's most powerful social movement organizations (Puryear

1994, 134-8).
The work of CERC, FLACSO, and other
research centers like them, constituted a turning
point for the opposition movement. Throughout
the years of military rule, would-be political
leaders had made unfounded and conflicting
claims concerning the "will of the people." For
the communists, the "will of the people" was, of
course, communism, for the socialists, socialism,
and so on. The availability of the hard empirical
data provided by the surveys forced adherents of
various ideologies to confront the indisputable
facts. What they found was both surprising and
encouragmg.
One of the most enlightening findings was
that the Chilean public generally held much
more moderate views than had previously been
supposed. The popular belief prior to the surveys, especially among the Left, was that the
Chilean public espoused fairly radical political

beliefs and was supportive of a violent overthrow
of the military regime. The strategy of social
mobilization that had characterized the opposition movement since the early days of the coup
reflected this ideology of change by force. This
belief was probably supported by the fact that
the most visible, if not the only visible, political activists were involved in radical, violent
political activities. Guerrilla groups such as the
MIR and the FPMR had left a long legacy of
political violence on the streets of Chile. Due to
the intimidating oppression of the Pinochet
regime, these groups were really the only actively
engaged protesters for many of the years of military rule. It was therefore only natural for the
elites to assume that the actions of the few represented the sentiment of the many. However, the
surveys revealed that in fact very few Chileans
supported a popular overthrow. While the surveys did prove that the majority favored a political transition, this support was contingent upon
it being enacted peacefully. This new revelation
forced a paradigmatic shift for many of the elites
at the helm of the social movement (Puryear

1994, 137).
Another important discovery of these surveys was that Pinochet's support among the
Chilean public had been underestimated by
the opposition's elites. Whereas before, the opposition had subscribed to the belief that the vast
majority of Chileans (excluding the wealthy capitalists) were strongly opposed to the military
government, the opposition leadership was now
forced to confront the finding that roughly onethird of the population were either constituents
or adherents of the countermovement that the
Pinochet government represented. The surveys
also indicated that another one-third of the population were neither constituents nor adherents of
either side. This helped the opposition leadership realize that a substantial recruiting effort
would be required if these potential beneficiaries
were to be converted to the movement to end
Pinochet's presidency. The sobering nature of
these facts forced opposition leadership to come
to terms with their unfounded hubris and to
realize that a transition to democracy would not
come as easily as they had previously believed.
On the positive side, by knowing its limitations
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and those of its enemy, the opposition was better prepared to confront the obstacles ahead
(Puryear 1994, 137).
Perhaps the most encouraging discovery of
the surveys was that the vast majority of the
Chilean public greatly valued democratic principles. In spite of almost a decade and a half of
authoritarian rule, political parties remained a
much-desired commodity. Chileans still identified themselves with various democratically oriented ideals and were supportive of a return to
thoroughly democratic governance. The conclusion drawn from these results portrayed a
Chilean public that opposed political violence,
was not entirely committed to any single political stance or to the exit of General Pinochet, but
that was almost uniformly supportive of democratic principles (Puryear 1994,137).
The research centers continued to be of
great importance to the opposition elites as they
began to reevaluate past approaches and to devise
new strategies for democratization. When the
CIS consortium was formed midway through
1987 by three academic research centers (CEO,
ILET, & SUR), it represented a more overtly and
deliberately political approach to the research
that had been performed by centers like
FLASCO and CERe. The CIS consortium had
as its mission the transformation of research findings into sophisticated political strategy and
modern campaign techniques. With the donated
assistance of the Sawyer/Miller group, an American political consulting firm, CIS was able to
make insightful recommendations to the opposition political parties that had been recently
organized or reorganized. Among the principal
members of CIS were intellectuals who were also
participating in a group known as the Technical
Committee for Free Elections. The primary purpose of the committee was to offer strategic
advice to the political parties pushing for free
elections. After a comprehensive review of the
important survey findings the committee realized
the fundamental inapplicability of social mobilization to the Chilean situation. The realization
that the public was opposed to tumultuous politics, cynical of new initiatives, weary of conventional forms of protests, and fearful of the
uncertainty of the future convinced the commit-
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tee to abandon the initiatives for free elections. It
was concluded that the most successful effort
would be an intense and comprehensive campaign to vote "no" in the upcoming plebiscite.
This new approach would manage the cynicism
and apathy prevalent among Chilean citizens by
simplifYing the campaign and by generating an
optimistic, even fraternal, sense of unity among
the various political factions. By just saying no
the populace would not be overwhelmed by the
complexities that had characterized the opposition programs up to that point. By unifYing the
cause the opposition would be playing upon a
perceived need in Chilean society to finally come
together in healing a countty fragmented by
years of political violence. Additionally, by abandoning the contentious demand for free elections, the opposition would be appeasing a
public already frightened by political conflict of
any kind (Puryear 1994, 138-42).
After having solidified their position, these
academics began an intensive effort to convince
the nonacademic political elites of the wisdom of
their stance. This would not be an easy task. The
position of these opposition political leaders, the
bulk of which formed the leadership of the
newly formed parties, had been that participation in the plebiscite was out of the question.
Most felt that the plebiscite of 1980 had been
corrupt and that the regime would again somehow ensure itself a victory. Leaders believed that
participation in the plebiscite would undermine
the position of the opposition movementPinochet was bound to win in any case, and
their participation would allow him the leverage
of claiming that he had been democratically
elected. Instead, they believed that, through
effective social mobilization, the opposition
movement could demand free elections, with
each political party presenting its candidate.
Through a series of weekly meetings conducted
by academics from CIS and from the Technical
Committee, these once dogmatic leaders were
subjected to facts that forced them to reevaluate
their previously incontestable assumptions.
These meetings, consisting of chat groups, dinner parties, and even campaign strategy classes,
were focused on dispelling the popular notions
regarding public opinion and in convincing the
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social movement organization leadership that
given an apathetic and frightened Chilean public, a bold campaign for free elections was an
untealistic strategy (Puryear 1994, 145). The
Pinochet government would hold the plebiscite,
with or without the approval of the opposition.
The constituents, adherents, and potential beneficiaries of the opposition movement would be
caught unprepared and without voter registration cards and Pinochet would win the
plebiscite, remaining in office for at least another
eight years. Given those odds, the regime would
not even need a rigged election to ensure victory.
After several months of this dialogue, the opposition elites were eventually won over to the
strategy of participation in the plebiscite and in
simply unifYing to vote Pinochet out of office.
In February of 1988, thirteen political parties
formed the "Concertacion para el No," a coalition reflecting this new approach (Roberts 1998,

128-9).
The Technical Committee was asked by
the coalition, which eventually consisted of sixteen parties, to conduct the plebiscite campaign.
Drawing from the survey findings, the committee built a campaign characterized by its appeal
to previously uncommitted Chileans and by its
optimistic, forward-looking approach. Having
discovered that the percentage of Pinochet supporters who were registered voters was significantly higher than all other segments of the
population, the committee undertook a comprehensive effort to register all social movement
constituents, adherents, and potential beneficiaries. The groups identified as being especially disengaged from the electoral system, such as urban
youth, were the targets of registration efforts that
had been tailored to appeal to such groups. The
result of these efforts was a drastic increase in
voter registration rates among those opposed to
the Pinochet government.
The way in which the social movement
elites framed the message of the campaign also
had substantial effects on the outcome of the
plebiscite. As a majority of the Chilean population was shown to have been cynical of all things
political, the campaign was designed as a promise of good feelings upon Pinochet's exit from
government. The campaign slogan became "La

Alegria Ya Viene." The fifteen-minute infomercials aired each night consisted of themes of
unity, peace, order, and happiness. Subsequent
surveys demonstrated a marked preference for
the media campaigns of the opposition over that
of the regime (Sigmund 1993, 172-4).
The sophisticated strategy of the social
movement elites, as embodied by the research
center academics and newly converted political
party leaders, led to a victory in the plebiscite
held on October 5, 1988. The opposition won
with almost 55% of the vote, forcing Pinochet
from office and reintroducing democracy to
Chile (Sigmund 1993, 175-6). Three months
later Patricio Aylwin, leader of the Christian
Democratic Party, was chosen as president
in a free and fair election (Sigmund 1993,

183-7).
While it is clear that the deprivation and
grievances of the Chilean public played a significant role in the success of the plebiscite, as
manifested by voter turnouts and simply by a
victorious outcome, their efforts in achieving
that success was marginal when compared with
the role of the social movement organizations
and the elites that were leading them. The function of the research institutions was especially
crucial. The research centers provided a home
base, so to speak, to the sophisticated elites
whose informed strategy provided the thrust
of the plebiscite campaign. The significance of
these research institutions in producing a dialogue among the different factions within the
movement and in creating a single approach
is especially evident when compared with the
earlier failures of the Chilean social movements.
The work that was done in conducting informative surveys, developing the basic strategy
of the campaign, registering previously uncommitted voters, and winning over potential beneficiaries was the indispensable element in
achieving a return to democratic governance
in Chile.

Correy Diviney is a graduate student from
Crestview, Florida. His plans include continuing
work in Washington, D. c., before attending
law school.
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1 John McCarthy and Mayer Zald's work in defining

Press.

the basic premises of the theory is drawn upon heavily in
the subsequent section.
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